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PSYCHIATRY AND THE CRIMINAL. By John M. MacDonald. Springfield, 
Illinois: Charles C. Thomas. 1958. Pp. 227. $5.50. 
Psychiatry is in an unenviable position because of the stereotype, too 
often a caricature, which has been created in the public mind by those 
who exploit the profession for purposes of public entertainment. The 
extreme claims made 'on its behalf by some of its less restrained practi-
tioners has brought down upon it some justified ridicule, or at least 
disbelief. Furthermore, the device of judicial notice, because of its con-
servative nature and because of the unsettled status of psychiatry as a 
science, has understandably been withheld when it has been advocated 
that psychiatry be given freer play in the courtroom. This is a battle-
field with no well-ordered line of battle, but one full of disordered ranks 
of participants of varied stature: jurists, clergymen, attorneys, psychiatrists, 
laymen who have read Karen Horney and Theodore Reik, and the do-it-
yourself crowd. 
It is a pleasant surprise, therefore, to run across a book written by a 
psychiatrist who declines to be a participant in the combat and who 
confines himself to the modest but meaningful pursuit of examining how 
the psychiatrist can, and should, work within the framework of the law 
as it stands. The book thus takes on a practical value not only for the 
practitioners involved but also for attorneys, judges, police and prosecution 
staffs. Mr. MacDonald is not crusading for a particular side or view-
point. He is interested in justice and how his profession can best help 
to obtain it. Interested parties are free to use the findings he has accu-
mulated through his experience as a psychiatrist working in the criminal 
courts. 
A sample of chapter headings indicates the scope of the work: The 
Simulation of Insanity; Narcoanalysis and Criminal Law; Amnesia; Epi-
lepsy and the Electroencephalogram; Alcoholism and the Law; The Sex 
Offender; The Juvenile Delinquent; Psychological Tests; The Psychia-
trist in the Witness Stand; and Treatment and Punishment. Some of the 
chapters are more detailed than others; this appears a little disappointing 
until one realizes that Professor MacDonald limits his observations to his 
own experiences rather than taking a textbook approach to his subject. 
As a responsible scientist, the author makes plain the limitations of 
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the processes and devices which the men of his profession employ, such 
as narcoanalysis and psychological tests. Furthermore, he shows an aware-
ness of the rights of the criminally accused consistently manifested when-
ever these rights are involved in one of the processes of examination. 
There. are no fireworks on the subject of criminal responsibility. As 
a professional man, he advocates some modification of the "right-wrong" 
M'Naghten test, but, like many of his colleagues, he sees the pitfalls in 
the ambiguities of the "product" rule announced in Durham v. United 
States.1 One authoritative commentator said of Durham: "The publications 
cited [in the opinion] contain serious errors .... Judge Bazelon's final 
conclusion, is unfortunately based on the psychiatric vagaries found in 
some of these publications."2 In regard to the "irresistible impulse" test, 
MacDonald issues a ·wry warning: "One should be careful to distinguish 
between an irresistible impulse and an impulse that was simply not 
resisted." He indicates a preference for the Scottish doctrine of diminished 
responsibility, which has been stated as follows: 
"Formerly there were only two classes of prisoner, those who were 
completely responsible, and those who were completely irresponsible. 
Our law has now come to recognize in murder cases a third class, 
those who, while they may not merit the description of being insane, 
are nevertheless in such a condition as to reduce the quality of their 
· act from murder to culpable homicide . . . there must be aberration 
or weakness of mind; there must be some form of mental unsound-
ness; there must be a state of mind bordering on, though not amount-
ing to, insanity; there must be a mind so affected that responsibility is 
diminished from full responsibility to partial responsibility; the 
prisoner in question must be only partially responsible for his 
actions."3 
The author's attitude is one of common sense. Although substan_tial 
insight into man's motives has developed in recent times, how can these 
motives ever be fully known and comprehended? Thus the jury, with 
its intuitive process, still has a r.ole to play, especially because psychiatry 
and the law have differing ends. Justice Arnold said in Holloway v. 
United States: 
"Legal tests of criminal insanity are not and cannot be the result 
of scientific analysis or objective judgment .... They must be based on 
the instinctive sense of justice of ordinary men. A complete recon-
ciliation between the medical tests of criminal responsibility and the 
moral tests of criminal responsibility is impossible. The purposes are 
different; the assumptions behind the two standards are different.''4 
However, the fact of admission of scientific evidence does not guarantee 
l (D.C. Cir. 1954) 214 F. (2d) 862. 
2 Wertham, "Psychoauthoritarianism and the Law," 22 UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 336 at 336 
Q%~. ' 
3 Royal Commission on Capital Punishment Report 392 (1953). 
4 (D.C. Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 665 at 666-667. 
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that it will be accepted by the jury. One need only recall Berry v. Chaplin,5 
a famous case dealing with a much more settled field of science, where 
the jury rejected the evidence of blood tests to disprove paternity. As for 
psychiatric evidence, the case of Ross v. State,6 decided in 1949, points 
out a similar hazard. The case was that of a murder trial which involved 
a plea of insanity at the time the murder of four people was committed 
by a San Antonio physician. A team of experts in psychiatry and mental 
disease testified that Ross, the doctor, was insane. No experts testified that 
he was sane, nor did the state offer any expert testimony, but it relied 
upon the testimony of peace officers involved in the arrest and upon 
character witnesses who knew the doctor. The trial jury had to decide 
whether Ross was so mentally deranged at the time of the killings as to 
make him incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong in his 
action, or whether he committed the crime under an irresistible impulse, 
which is lack of control rather than of understanding. It was reported: 
"Despite the unanimous medical testimony that Dr. Ross was insane 
and incapable of knowing right from wrong, the jury required only 
fifteen minutes of deliberation to reach their verdict, which was guilty 
with the penalty of death."7 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 
affirmed the conviction of Ross. However, on a subsequent separate trial, 
Dr. Ross was found insane.8 
Admittedly, psychiatry has yet to attain the position of other sciences 
in terms of general acceptability, but the subsequent finding of insanity in 
the Ross case as contrasted with the fifteen-minute deliberation of the jury 
on all the evidence, including the expert psychiatric testimony, reveals 
that the jury is essentially a body of laymen with many deficiencies or 
misconceptions in their knowledge of the sciences. 
However, the problem of adjustment between psychiatry and the 
law need not be an overly complicated one. First of all, the plain facts 
must be faced: we have learned a great deal about man's mind and his 
motivations since the M'Naghten case of over a century ago. This knowl-
edge, or that part of it which is generally accepted, ought to be put to 
use in the process of securing justice for society and the individual. As 
long as the limits of psychiatry remain undefined and there is disagree-
ment over the validity of known discoveries and developments, the law 
cannot commit itself to any broad statements of acceptance. It is evident 
that no formula comparable to that of the radar speedmeter is going to 
emerge in this field. Judges realize this, but are apt to err in the other 
direction, that is, to retard recognition of types of testimony which 
could be of use. 
5 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1946) 169 P. (2d) 442. 
6 (Tex. Crim. App. 1948) 220 S.W. (2d) 137. 
7 McCormick, "Science, Experts, and the Courts," 29 TEJC. L. R.Ev. 611 at 621 (1951). 
S!bid. 
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What can be done is to work from the bottom up; in other words, 
to adjust the rules of evidence so as to enable the psychiatrist to testify 
in terms more relevant to our time and our new knowledge, and to give 
some legislative sanction to a broadening of judicial discretion, particu-
larly in instructions to the jury. It is to the credit of some courts that this 
has already been done in practice, but more uniformity and recognition 
is needed. In the meantime, the criminal law must punish the evildoer, 
treat and correct those who are partially responsible, and provide for the 
proper care of the irresponsible. Mr. MacDonald's book will help in 
these tasks. 
Raymond L. Carol, 
Associate Professor of Political Science, 
St. John's University Graduate School 
